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Speaking for Others 
Lauren Marino 
 
Speaker location is a recent yet important 
discussion in the philosophy of language.  It was 
suggested by Linda Alcoff in her article “The Problem 
of Speaking for Others” that a speaker’s location affects 
not only the meaning but also the truth of what is said.1  
With this in mind, there are two problems with 
speaking for other people that need to be resolved.   The 
first is the relation of language to the self, and the 
access we have to the experience of others.  The second 
is the political dimension that determines the effective 
and appropriate situations for speaking for others.  I 
will argue that the self is constituted through language 
games and as such, when we speak for others we must 
be careful not to remove agency from the other, and 
force upon them our definition of who they are.  I will 
argue that bell hooks’ argument for the oppressed to 
create new language games through organic 
intellectuals is the best struggle in which the oppressed 
can engage. 
 To determine the relationship between language 
and the self is to determine how language gains 
meaning.  This is a strange endeavor to the non-
philosopher.  Lay people don’t need to question why 
others comprehend what they say.  They are understood 
and understand others as well.  To ask what they mean 
by their language is a superfluous investigation.  Why? 
Because language hasn’t failed yet.  Words seem so 
organic that it is often difficult to step back and try to 
understand how they work.  A theory of meaning is not 
necessary for words to work.  Yet philosophy does 
                                                
1 Alcoff, Linda.  “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” Cultural 
Critique (Winter): 5-32. 1991 
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search for such a system.  The danger is that philosophy 
will muddle a perfectly functional system. 
The initial understanding of language is implied in the 
philosophy of Descartes.  Descartes views the mind as a 
private place.  The mind has thoughts that it conveys to 
the world through language.  I have a thought inside my 
private mind which I then translate into language.  
Words stand in for these private ideas, ideas to which 
only the speaker has access.  The outside world cannot 
know my mind except through the language I use to 
describe it.  Language therefore gains meaning directly 
from the Cartesian mind. 
 Wittgenstein offers a different understanding of 
language and the self.  He rejects the idea that language 
could gain meaning from a private objects in the mind 
of a speaker.  He believes that language gains meaning 
through public use in a community of speakers.  The 
classic example of this is Wittgenstein’s king piece on a 
chessboard.  To teach someone what a king is, we can 
point to a king and say, “This is a king,” but she doesn’t 
actually understand what the piece is until she 
understands the use of the piece in the game.  The game 
metaphor is extended to language.  As in a game, the 
use of language must be rule guided.  In order to 
communicate with each other, we need to understand 
the rules of communication.  The rules of chess make 
the game and define a use for the term “king.”  When 
we understand the rules, we are initiated and can play 
chess ourselves.  Language functions in the same way.  
There are multiple language games, each with their own 
context and rules of use.  The rules of use are specific 
to each game.  Like games, language games are created 
and die; they evolve until we have no use for them.  
There are multiple language games, each specific to 
their form.   
 As a result, for Wittgenstein, there can be no 
private language that refers to objects accessible to the 
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speaker alone.  In order to participate in a language 
game I have to be familiar with rules.  I learn rules 
through socialization, because my community teaches 
me the rules.  Just as I learned to play gin rummy by my 
family teaching the rules to me, my family also taught 
me how to use words in different language games.  I 
was taught that the word believe in the sentence “I 
believe in God,” was used differently then in the 
sentence “I believe you.”  I was initiated into the 
language games of religion and trust.  But the rules I 
learned were contingent on my community.  Correct 
usage was determined by the community’s 
understanding of the rules.  Understanding this correct 
usage is being initiated into the language game.  
 As in regular games, I cannot play a language 
game when I do not know the rules.  When I went to 
play gin rummy at a friend’s house, I lost a hundred 
points for holding the queen of spades at the end of a 
hand.  An alien rule to me, I was upset that I lost, and 
from my perspective unfairly.  We were playing two 
different games, because the rules were different.  
Language works the same way.  The sentence “I believe 
in God,” means something different to a Catholic than 
to a Protestant.  To understand the rules, we have to be 
initiated. 
 Private language cannot determine meaning in 
the manner Wittgenstein describes and others cannot be 
initiated into a private language.  The objects, the 
thoughts of a Cartesian mind, are in an exclusive space 
that others cannot enter.  As such we have an 
epistemological privilege where our own minds are 
concerned.  Whatever seems to be the case is the case.  
Because we individually determine the use of a private 
language, there is no way we can be wrong.  If 
everything is in accordance with a rule, it is doubtful 
we have a rule at all. In fact, not only do we not have a 
rule but the language would be meaningless even for 
 38 
the person whose language it is.  Without a rule 
following, no public consensus can be reached.  
Without a rule, a word can have no regular use and 
hence no meaning.  Language is used to make 
connections between individuals and this requires that 
we follow rules.  Wittgenstein writes that "If language 
is to be a means of communication there must be 
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this 
may sound) in judgments." 2  To base a language game 
on something the individual has exclusive access to, is a 
failing language game.  It cannot use language because, 
“the individual words of this language are to refer to 
what can only be known to the person speaking; to his 
immediate private sensations.  So another person cannot 
understand the language.”3Meaning is lost.  Private 
language cannot follow public rules and cannot produce 
meaning.   
 The concept of a self within this framework 
shifts from Descartes self inside a private mind, to a 
self that is public, constituted within language games 
and the self becomes contingent.  Each person is 
familiar with her own set of language games.  While 
each person may have a unique combination of 
language games, none of the language games within the 
set is unique to that individual alone.  There is no 
private self, within this understanding of language.  
Rather our experience is constituted through a public 
language.  Therefore the self is not an isolated private 
mind, but rather the self is constituted by language 
games.  Richard Rorty argues that a self constituted by 
language games is itself contingent, because if I change 
my languages games I change myself.  This also means 
that selves cannot exist outside of language because 
                                                
2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig.  Philosophical Investigations.  Englewood, 
NJ: Prentice Hall.  1958 (#242) 
3 Ibid. (#243) 
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language comprises the self.  In this interpretation, a 
private Cartesian self is nonsensical. 
 The experience of oppression is usually 
perceived to be a private language.  Only an individual 
knows how she is oppressed and how it affects her.  
The problem is that because no one else has access to 
my mind, whatever seems to be the case is the case.  As 
far as my thoughts are concerned, my use of language 
to describe my internal feelings is the only language 
that can be used to describe them, and the distinction 
between correct and incorrect rule following collapses.  
This is not to say we should doubt a person when she 
says she feels oppressed.  Rather, Wittgenstein believes 
this form of skepticism is embedded in a Cartesian 
understanding of the mind.  When I speak, I play a 
language game that no one has been initiated into.  I 
define meaning.  This is suspect foundation for a 
language game, because language is not a private 
activity.  We use language to make connections 
between individuals.  The problem is that oppression 
takes the form of oppression of individuals.  For 
example, torture is not a common experience within a 
community.  The experience does not gain voice within 
a community because it is not an experience that others 
will share.  Hence, no language can be developed to 
speak about it. 
 However, there is hope within Wittgenstein’s 
arguments if we apply a new political dimension with 
Rorty and Alcoff.  These views of language implicate 
the philosophical relationship between language and the 
self.  The Cartesian sense of self means that only I can 
accurately speak for myself, because my thoughts are in 
a private space no one else can enter.  It is not created 
by speaking, but rather it simply exists as a stable entity.  
This extends to the problem of speaking for others, 
because only an oppressed group knows how they are 
oppressed and how it affects them.  The problem is that 
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because no one else outside the group has access to 
their subjective state of oppression.   The language they 
may use to express it functions as a private language to 
the rest of society.  All specific language games 
functions this way.  However, the language game the 
oppressed use to express their oppression is one that 
necessarily needs to transcend its community to spur 
change.  But, no one but the oppressed can play it, and 
therefore no outside connection can be made.  It cannot 
produce public meaning. 
 However, if language gains meaning from use, 
then access to the private objects of the oppressed 
group’s language game is not hopeless.  There is no 
longer a private self but only the public self.  We, 
including the oppressed, become our descriptions of 
ourselves.  Groups can fall into dominant language 
games and descriptions, but in doing so we allow others 
to define who we are.  We must determine what is true 
of and for ourselves.  I conclude with Rorty that: 
 
It was Nietzche who…suggested that we drop the 
idea of “knowing the truth.”…He hope that once we 
realized that Plato’s “true world” was just a fable, 
we would seek consolation…in being that peculiar 
sort of dying animal who, by describing himself in 
his own terms, had created himself.  More exactly, 
he would have created the only part of himself that 
mattered by constructing his own mind.  To create 
one’s mind is to create one’s own language…4 
 
There is no privileged truth but rather truth is relative to 
our adopted language games.  Truth becomes not 
objective Truth, but something that is agreed upon; it is 
contingent. 
                                                
4 Rorty, Richard.  Contigency, Irony and Solidarity. Boston: 
Cambridge University Press. 1989 
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 This brings us to the political issue.  The 
intuitive response is to do everything possible to allow 
the oppressed to speak for themselves.  This is not 
always possible.  But, if language constitutes the self, 
then who can speak for the oppressed and how can she 
do so?  Alcoff’s understanding of speaking for others is 
a good starting point.5  Her general argument is that the 
location of the speaker affects the meaning and truth of 
what is said.  Moreover, the location of the speaker 
affects the speech itself.  Language is a creative activity 
and what we create is contingent on where we are 
located within society. Alcoff’s arguments can be added 
to Rorty’s interpretation of the self.  When we speak we 
are not only creating new truth relative to the language 
games we employ, but we create ourselves.  Hooks uses 
this idea of selves to create a political program for 
oppressed groups.  She extends the metaphor of 
language as a game.  If language is a game then it has 
elements of competition and power, and even 
playfulness.  These elements can be used to make a 
speech for others a speech to their advantage, but with a 
few caveats.  The first is that we initially resist the urge 
to speak for others and listen to them.  This ideally 
allows the speaker to share agency with the oppressed 
by including them in the creative process.   Secondly, 
we must account for our location and context when we 
speak.  President Bush’s analysis of Iraq is very 
different from that of an Iraqi.  Each should account for 
the way their location affects his speech.  Third, the 
speaker must be responsible for her own speech.  
Speaking on behalf of someone else doesn’t enable the 
speaker to speak without thought.  Finally, the speaker 
must attempt to take account of the affects of the speech.  
Ultimately, we must recognize that speaking and 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
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silence are always a political decision.  We must use 
our voice consciously. 
 If the self is located within language games the 
there is a commonality between those who share 
language games.  This removes some of the barriers 
between selves and I do have access to the experience 
of those with whom I share language games.  Sharing 
language games means sharing experience.  I am able to 
speak for those who language games I play.  There are 
some problems with this understanding.  Alcoff thinks 
membership in a group is not precise or determinate.   It 
is unclear which groups I could belong to and which of 
those groups I should single out to affiliate myself.  
More importantly, membership in a group doesn’t 
necessarily mean an authority to speak for the whole 
group.  However, if we accept that the self is 
constituted within language, then those who share 
language games with me have direct access to my 
experience in away that no one can ever have access to 
a Cartesian mind.  We do not need to ask for absolute 
identity, language and experience between speakers but 
just a commonality.  Furthermore, Bernstein argues that 
we cannot speak without speaking for other people.6  
The speaker’s location is necessarily a location in 
relation to other people.  The relationship cannot be 
removed, and we cannot avoid it.  Speaking at all 
makes speaking for others inevitable. 
 We return to the intuitive response to the 
struggle of oppressed groups: have the group speak for 
itself.  Speaking becomes a type of agency in which I 
construct myself because contrary to a Cartesian self, 
selves do not exist prior to or separate from language.  
To lose my speech is to lose myself.  The oppressed 
have the ability to communicate with each other and 
through their language game they are able to discuss 
                                                
6 Bernstein, Susan.  
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their struggle with one another.  Sharing languages 
games enables the oppressed to a specific, limited 
dimension of power.  Their language game will always 
fail to communicate their struggle to those who have 
not been initiated into it.  They have direct access to the 
experience of oppression and their agency, but they can 
only reach their own group.  Those on the margin 
cannot reach those in the center.  On the other hand, 
those in the center, the elites, share a language that can 
reach the majority of society.  It is a language game 
they are familiar with and can use adeptly.  However, 
they do not have the experience with or access to the 
language game of the oppressed.  They have the power 
to use their language but nothing to say.  The catch-22 
is the choice between a group who embodies the agency 
and the dimensions of political struggle against 
oppression without a way to communicate it to the 
larger community, and a group with the language to 
reach society but is ignorant of the political struggle.  
There lies a need for a synergy between the experience 
of the oppressed on the margins and the language game 
of those in the center. 
 The synergy requires a speaker who comes from 
the oppressed but has knowledge of the language game 
of the center.  Such a person could incorporate the 
experience of the oppressed into a new language game 
that could be accessed by those in power.  The concern 
is what is lost and sacrificed in translation.  If the 
language games are so disparate that initiation in one, 
offers no insight into the rules of the other, than there is 
doubt that translation can be done at all.  If translation 
cannot be done, the best to be hoped for is cooption 
forcing the margins into the mainstream. 
 What then is the solution?  I agree with bell 
hooks that the oppressed mist celebrate their position on 
the margins.  The oppressed should not try to move into 
the center but appreciate their counterculture.  The 
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oppressed must produce intellectuals so that the 
dominated can speak to the dominating.  The idea goes 
back to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the organic 
intellectual.7  The elites are indoctrinated in the ruling 
ideology and have an investment in the current order.  
No matter how progressive their politics may be, the 
elite will always be the elite.  Their investment in the 
current social order precludes offers of true systemic 
change.  Gramsci writes of the need for the working 
class to develop its own intellectuals who are 
organically tied to their class.   This argument is similar 
to hooks’ argument.  The margin must produce organic 
intellectuals.  It might be thought that these organic 
intellectuals should translate between language games.  
But as hooks points out, using “the oppressor’s 
language” is not adequate because it cannot articulate 
the experience of the oppressed.  Yet, it is the only 
language game the oppressing can play.  Organic 
intellectuals affect the center from the margins if they 
are able to incorporate multiple voices in the texts they 
create. 
 The goal of the organic intellectual according to 
hooks is to “identify the spaces where we begin a 
process of revision” to create a counter-ideology. 8  
Hooks relates this agency to language.  “Language is 
also a place of struggle.”9  The counterculture can 
produce a counter-language, which is able to produce a 
new language to mediate between the margins and the 
center.  Necessarily the new game must include 
portions of both old language games or no one will 
understand it.  It must use old understandings to create 
                                                
7 Gramsci, Antonio.  The Prison Notebooks.  The Intellectuals.  
New York: International Publishers.  1971 p.3-23 
8 hooks, bell. “Choosing the Margin as a Space of Radical 
Openness.” Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics.   
Between the Lines.  1990. 
9 Ibid. 
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new meanings.  These counter-languages can function 
as the intermediary language games that the oppressed 
and the elites can be initiated simultaneously.  A new 
language game must be created. 
 A good example of this is Martin Luther King’s 
“I Have a Dream” speech.  He used concepts of 
freedom and democracy familiar to the center to explain 
the experience of the oppressed within in the 
mainstream language game, as well as created new 
metaphors and linguistic form, i.e. the preacher’s 
sermon, to bring the voice of the oppressed and the 
oppressors into a realm of communication.  (bell hooks 
uses the preachers sermon form in her refrain ‘language 
is also a place of struggle’).10  One famous metaphor is 
freedom as a bounced check to African Americans.  
This created a new understanding of the situation.  It 
worked between the language of oppression understood 
by African Americans and the center’s understanding of 
freedom and the promises of democracy.  King was 
able to include multiple voices, building a bridge 
between the margin and the center. 
 The conclusion of hooks is that the margin can 
be more than a place of oppression and alienation.  It 
can be “a site of radical possibility, a space of 
resistance,” that is not open to those in the center.   It is 
the space to produce counter-hegemonic culture that the 
organic intellectual is looking for.  The oppressed can 
retell their story, and if we accept Rorty’s argument that 
the self is contingent, the oppressed create themselves 
in the process.  To speak for the oppressed is to silence 
them.  Moreover, in their absence of voice, we define 
them.  We can define them in many ways, but they will 
always be a “they” and not an “us.”  They will be the 
other.  We must have faith in the margins to produce 
new language games to communicate with us. 
                                                
10 Ibid.  
